A Return to Lüth1
by Peter E. Quint2

In a complex constitutional system that relies on enforcement
by courts, a single judicial decision may well present several
different aspects for analysis. Thus, to take a well-known
example, the famous American case of New York Times v.
Sullivan3 may be viewed from a number of different perspectives.
It might be analyzed, for example, as a tort case, a First
Amendment case, an essay on the implications of popular
sovereignty, or as a significant step in the history of the American
Civil Rights Movement. In a single study of a particular decision,
however, it may not be possible to do justice to all significant
aspects of the case; moreover, the importance of one of these
various perspectives may become evident only over time. After
writing about a particular decision, therefore, an author might
feel drawn to revisit the case at a later point perhaps after some
years and seek to approach it from a new or different
perspective. I would like to do that today with the famous Lüth4
case, decided in 1958 by the German Constitutional Court one of
the landmarks of German constitutional law.
—

—

—

Over the years, the complex opinion in the Lüth case has been
1. An earlier version of this essay was delivered at the 2009 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, and the colloquial tone
of that presentation has been retained to the extent possible. Several of the
points contained in this article have been discussed by the author -- but
with a rather different focus -- in Peter E. Quint, 60 Years of the Basic Law and
its Interpretation: An American Perspective, 57 JAHRBUCH DES ÖFFENTLICHEN
RECHTS DER G EGENWART 1, 3-9 (2009). Unless otherwise noted, all
translations in this article are those of the author.
2. Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional Law, University of
Maryland School of Law.
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958).
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the subject of considerable doctrinal analysis. Lüth is the locus
classicus of the German doctrine that the Constitution
“influences” German private law, and thus it is an important early
source for contemporary debates on the “horizontal” application of
constitutional rights among private citizens.5 Moreover, the Lüth
case mapped out a (non-textual) means by which the
constitutional guarantee of the freedom of expression could play a
significant role in German constitutional law, and it was the first
case that emphasized the freedom of expression as a central
concern in German constitutionalism. The Court’s views on these
subjects (still somewhat controversial in Germany today) continue
t o be w o rthy o f anal ysi s by G e rm an sch o l ars and by
comparativists from other constitutional traditions. In addition to
these primarily doctrinal approaches, others have contributed
more theoretical discussions of Lüth, which have sought to
discover the philosophical origins of the opinion in the writings of
the notable Weimar theorist Rudolf Smend or in the post-War
legal theory of the eminent constitutionalist Günter Dürig.6
In an article published over twenty years ago, I undertook a
doctrinal analysis of Lüth, along with some comparative remarks
one among several doctrinal analyses of Lüth that have been
published by various writers over the years.7 In the present
essay, however, I do not intend to discuss the Lüth case from a
doctrinal or theoretical perspective. Rather, I would like to
approach the decision somewhat differently as an historical
—

—

5. See, e.g., Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SA 850 (S. Afr.); Jacco
Bomhoff, Lüth’s 50th Anniversary: Some Comparative Observations on the
German Foundations of Judicial Balancing, 9 GERMAN L.J. 121 (2008).
6. See UWE WESEL, DER GANG NACH KARLSRUHE 131, 138 (2004);
Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, Zurück zum klassischen Menschenwürdebegriff!
Eine Erinnerung an Lüth, Dürig und Kant, in DAS LÜTH-URTEIL AUS
(RECHTS-) HISTORISCHER SICHT 349 (Thomas Henne & Arne Riedlinger eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Henne & Riedlinger]; Stefan Ruppert, Geschlossene
Wertordnung? Zur Grundrechtstheorie Rudolf Smends, in Henne &
Riedlinger at 327-48.
7. Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German
Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247 (1989). For recent discussions of
Lüth, see, e.g., Bomhoff, supra note 5; Hannes Rösler, Harmonizing the
German Civil Code of the Nineteenth Century with a Modern Constitution The Lüth Revolution 50 Years Ago in Comparative Perspective, 23 TUL. EUR.
& CIV. L. F. 1 (2008). The Henne & Riedlinger collection, see supra note 6,
presents a wealth of historical information on the Lüth case and contains
numerous doctrinal reflections on the decision as well.
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artifact in what might broadly be called the denazification of
German law and society after World War II.
First, let me sketch the facts of the case. During World War
II, the well-known German actor Veit Harlan directed a film
entitled Jud Suess, which is generally acknowledged to have been
the most vicious anti-Semitic film of the Nazi era. Working under
Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, Harlan was also a coauthor of the screenplay. Veit Harlan became a “leading
representative” of the film industry in the “Third Reich,” and Jud
Suess, which was seen by twenty-two million viewers, was the
greatest commercial success of the Nazi period.8 Many observers
believe that this anti-Semitic film was intended by Nazi officials to
prepare the way for the coming of the Holocaust.9
After the War, Harlan faced prosecution as a result of his
work on Jud Suess. A criminal court ultimately found that
Harlan’s work on the film did indeed constitute a crime against
humanity, but he was acquitted on the grounds that he was acting
under Goebbels’ orders. He was also exonerated in denazification
proceedings.
In 1950, Veit Harlan made his post-War debut as a director
with a new film entitled “Immortal Beloved.” Erich Lüth, a city
official in Hamburg who had worked for the post-War
reconciliation of Christians and Jews in Germany, was incensed
that the notorious director of Jud Suess could simply re-emerge on
the scene, apparently unscathed. Accordingly, Lüth issued public
statements calling for a boycott of Harlan’s new film, and these
statements accelerated a protest movement against the film
throughout Germany.10 In response, the distributors of Immortal
Beloved filed a civil action against Lüth, and the civil courts −
invoking Article 826, one of the famous “general clauses” of the
German Civil Code issued an injunction prohibiting Lüth from
repeating his call for a boycott. After an unsuccessful appeal in
the civil court system, Lüth filed a complaint in the Constitutional
Court, asserting that the civil courts had violated his
—

8. PETER REICHEL, VERGANGENHEITSBEWÄLTIGUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND: DIE
AUSEINANDERSETZUNG MIT DER NS-DIKTATUR VON 1945 BIS HEUTE 131 (2001);
WESEL, supra note 6, at 133.
9. Id. at 132-33.
10. Arne Riedlinger, Vom Boykottaufruf zur Verfassungsbeschwerde, in
Henne & Riedlinger, supra note 6, at 149.
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constitutional rights of free expression.
In what has been called the “most important” decision of the
Constitutional Court with respect to constitutional rights,11 the
Court ultimately found that the injunction against Lüth violated
his constitutional rights of free expression. More specifically, the
justices found that constitutional rights exercised a very great
“influence” on cases of private law and that, in the process of
balancing that the Court required for cases of this type, Lüth’s
rights of free expression outweighed the countervailing interests
of the film distributors.
The Constitutional Court today is one of the most important
of all German institutions. But at the time of Lüth, it was still an
experiment that did not evoke universal approbation or respect.
Moreover, beyond the Constitutional Court, there was a populace
which just a few years earlier as one German scholar has put it
would have elected Hitler overwhelmingly “even in a free and
secret election.”12
No doubt there were many unreconstructed Nazis within
German society of the early post-War era, but such views were
rarely disclosed in public discourse.13 Rather, two particularly
pronounced trends seem to be discernable in the mentalities of the
divided West German society of the 1950s. Certainly, there were
many intermediate views, but I think a description of the two
polar positions captures something quite important about the
period.
—

—

In the first group were people who sought continuity with the
past, including even aspects of the Nazi past, and were willing
either to forget the more painful aspects of that past, or to say
that what had happened was really not so bad that in many
ways the Nazi state had been a “normal” state and the great
sweep of German history was more important.14 An ingrained
—

—

11. W ESEL , supra note 6, at 131.
12. Norbert Frei, Hitlers Eliten nach 1945-eine Bilanz, in NORBERT FREI
et al., KARRIEREN IM ZWIELICHT: HITLERS ELITEN NACH 1945 at 303 (2001).
13. “[A]s a major force in political life, [Nazism] had been and remained
defeated and discredited.” Jeffrey Herf, Multiple Restorations: German
Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism, 26 CENT. EUR. HIST. 21,
24 (1993).
14. See, e.g., JOACHIM PERELS, DAS JURISTISCHE ERBE DES “DRITTEN
REICHES” 19 (1999) (criticizing the view of many German jurists in the 1950s
that, in its general tendency, the Nazi regime was a “normal” state); FRITZ

2011]

77

A RETURN TO LÜTH

nationalism often lay behind this position, and it was sometimes
accompanied by authoritarian political views. For lack of a better
term, we could adopt a widely employed (albeit controversial) term
in the historical literature and call this complex of ideas the
“Restorationist” view.
The opposing view which we can call the “Reconstructionist”
view was frequently held by persons who had long opposed the
Nazis, and it paralleled the evident goals of the western
occupation forces. According to this view, a completely new
beginning was necessary. The crimes and aggressions of the Nazi
regime and the complicity of the populace showed that
German politics and society must be broadly reconstructed in
order to mark a complete break from the past.15 As time went on,
a movement of “Americanization” in Germany, which was already
evident in the 1950s, seemed to reinforce these Reconstructionist
views by impelling even traditional structures to develop in a
more open and democratic direction.16
—

—

—

—

Of course, decisions of courts may often reflect tendencies of
thought in society; it is perhaps no surprise that in its early years
the Constitutional Court appeared to reflect aspects of each of
these polar views at different times. These cases may suggest
that in severely split societies courts can hold opposing positions
in a kind of equipoise until perhaps, eventually, one view
prevails.
Certainly, in its first seven years leading up to Lüth, the
Constitutional Court adopted views that seemed to fall on both
sides of this divide. In a strong Reconstructionist decision in 1952,
for example, the Court banned the SRP, a neo-Nazi group whose
large crowds and (relatively modest) electoral successes had
alarmed the occupying Allies.17 In its influential opinion in this
case, the Court developed the concept of the “free democratic basic
—

STERN, FIVE GERMANYS I HAVE KNOWN 197-98, 211 (2006) (noting the
“collective amnesia” of many Germans in the early post-War years).
15. See, e.g., KONRAD H. JARAUSCH, AFTER HITLER: RECIVILIZING GERMANS,
1945-1995, at 6 (Brandon Hunziker trans., 2006).
16. See Diethelm Prowe, The “Miracle” of the Political-Culture Shift, in
THE MIRACLE YEARS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WEST GERMANY, 1949-1968, at
451-57 (Hanna Schissler ed., 2001).
17. 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952); see NORBERT FREI, ADENAUER’S GERMANY AND THE
NAZI PAST: THE POLITICS OF AMNESTY AND INTEGRATION 251-76 (Joel Golb
trans., 2002).
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order” (freie demokratische Grundordnung), the irreducible
elements of constitutionalism that must be protected against
political parties that seek to impair or abolish the constitution.
The governing documents of the SRP apparently did not expressly
advocate National Socialist doctrine, and the Court reached out to
find convincing parallels between statements, structures, and
rituals of the SRP and those of Hitler’s Nazi party itself.
In contrast, the Constitutional Court seemed to adopt
Restorationist views in 1957, when it found rather surprisingly
that Hitler’s Concordat with the Vatican (which had helped
stabilize the Nazi regime in 1933) was actually still in effect under
the law of the Federal Republic although federalism somewhat
limited the treaty’s reach.18 In the course of this opinion, the
Court also surprisingly accepted the validity of the Enabling
Law (Ermächtigungsgesetz) of 1933, under which the remnants of
the Weimar parliament transferred dictatorial powers to Hitler.19
In the same opinion, however, the Court emphasized that the
federalism of the Basic Law represented a sharp break from the
“unitary state” of the Nazi dictatorship.20
—

—

—

—

—

In the famous KPD case of 1956,21 the Court banned the West
German Communist Party, under the principles of the SRP case.
In the KPD decision, the Court adopted the Restorationist
doctrine that the “German Reich” a somewhat mystical
overarching construct of German statehood had not disappeared
with the surrender at the end of World War II but rather
continued on in international and domestic law.22 The doctrine of
the “continuing Reich” was accepted by the great majority of the
German professors of public law many of whom had remained in
their positions under the Nazis and continued on undisturbed in
—

—

—

18. 6 BVerfGE 309 (1957). On the history of the Concordat, see HAJO
HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY 1840-1945, at 743 (1969).
19. 6 BVerfGE at 330-31. The validity of the Enabling Law was arguably
necessary as a prerequisite for the validity of the Concordat, because the
Enabling Law removed any requirement of parliamentary approval of the
treaty (an authorization that was not sought or obtained). Id. at 331.
Although the Enabling Law was not consistent with the Weimar
Constitution, the Court found that it was valid “as a step in the revolutionary
founding of the national-socialist rule of force.” Id.
20. Id. at 360-61.
21. 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956).
22. Id. at 126-27.
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the Federal Republic.23 Writing from exile, the great legal
philosopher Hans Kelsen was one of the few to assert the
Reconstructionist doctrine that the German state had disappeared
at the end of the War and that any new German state would be a
completely new entity.24
A particularly dramatic battle between the Restorationists
and the Reconstructionists focused on the fate of the Nazi civil
service.25 According to the Restorationist view, the civil service
survived the Nazi period intact, and therefore Nazi civil servants
were constitutionally entitled to employment, pensions, and
related benefits in the Federal Republic. In contrast, the
Reconstructionist view was that the civil service had been so
debased that it was nothing more than an arm of the Nazi regime,
and thus it came to an end upon that regime’s demise with the
result that Nazi civil servants possessed no entitlements under
the Basic Law.
—

In its great Civil Service decision in 1953,26 the Constitutional
Court strongly adopted the Reconstructionist position, cutting off
any constitutional claims of Nazi civil servants. Interestingly, this
decision might seem to be inconsistent with the doctrine of the
continuing German “Reich”, expressed in the (slightly later) KPD
opinion as noted above, but the decision rested primarily on the
Court’s understanding of the special nature of the German civil
service, rather than on any broader doctrines of continuity or
discontinuity of the state itself.
23. See, e.g., Joachim Perels, Zur Rechtslehre vor und nach 1945, in
KONTINUITÄTEN UND ZÄSUREN: RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT UND JUSTIZ IM “DRITTEN
REICH” UND IN DER NACHKRIEGSZEIT 135-36 (Eva Schumann ed., 2008);
Michael Stolleis, Die Staatsrechtslehre der fünfziger Jahre, in Henne &
Riedlinger, supra note 6, at 298.
24. Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany According to the
Declaration of Berlin, 39 AM. J. INT’L. L. 518 (1945); Hans Kelsen, The
International Legal Status of Germany to be Established Immediately upon
Termination of the War, 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 689 (1944).
25. This story has been cogently recounted in Hans W. Baade, Social
Science Evidence and the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany, 23
J. POL. 421, 430-48 (1961); Hans W. Baade, Hoggan’s History-A West German
Case Study in the Judicial Evaluation of History, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 391, 398401 (1968). See also Jörg Menzel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in der frühen
Judikatur des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Beamten- und Gestapo-Urteil, in
Henne & Riedlinger, supra note 6, at 225-35.
26. 3 BVerfGE 58 (1953); see also 3 BVerfGE 288 (1954) (Soldiers Case).
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The German constitutionalists almost unanimously opposed
the Civil Service decision.27 Moreover, in a strong Restorationist
opinion, the highest civil and criminal court (the BGH) challenged
the Constitutional Court on this issue.28 In the famous Gestapo
case,29 however, the Constitutional Court responded to this
judicial “test of power” (Machtprobe)30 with a stern rebuke to the
BGH. In this decision, the Court also took the occasion to
emphasize that the Nazi civil service had been directly implicated
in carrying out wide-spread measures of oppression against Jews
and other groups.31 Thus, in the Constitutional Court, the
Reconstructionist view clearly prevailed on this issue. But, in the
country at large, the Restorationists had the last laugh, because
the German parliament had passed a statute that restored many
rights to former members of the Nazi civil service and eased the
return of many former party members into bureaucratic
positions.32
Against this background, therefore, we can see that the Lüth
case also posed an important struggle between the Restorationists
and the Reconstructionists.33 Veit Harlan himself was a prime
Restorationist figure: in his effort to reestablish his career in postWar Germany, he was drawing upon his fame as director of the
notorious film Jud Suess and other works of the Nazi period. The
implied message of Harlan’s re-emergence was that his activity in
the “Third Reich” his key participation in the anti-Semitic
propaganda machine was really not so bad and could be
forgotten or, even worse, was commendable and should count in
—

—

27. Baade, Social Science Evidence, supra note 25, at 442-43. A few
Reconstructionist voices defended the opinion. One noted article called it “a
German Magna Carta of self-reflection,” which “tears away” the “veil of
forgetting” that covers the Nazi era. Reinhold Kreile, Eine Deutsche Magna
Charta der Selbstbesinnung, 9 FRANKFURTER HEFTE 83, 85-86 (1954).
28. 13 BGHZ 265 (1954).
29. 6 BVerfGE 132 (1957).
30. Menzel, supra note 25, at 227.
31. See FREI, ADENAUER’S GERMANY, supra note 17, at 63. For a highly
interesting discussion of the Civil Service and Gestapo decisions as
forerunners of Lüth in the Court’s effort to confront the Nazi past, see
Menzel, supra note 25, at 232-35. Menzel notes that the SRP case could also
be included in this context. Id. at 235 n.35.
32. F REI , A DENAUER ’ S G ERMANY , supra note 17, at 41-66; see
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] (Constitution) Art. 131 (Ger.).
33. See, e.g., Riedlinger, supra note 10, at 151-56.
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his favor.34 Of course, it was precisely this “Restoration” that
Lüth was trying to prevent in his call for a boycott of Harlan’s new
film.
In this light, the decision of the Constitutional Court,
protecting Lüth’s call for a boycott, was a victory for the
Reconstructionist point of view. Indeed, it was a Reconstructionist
decision of the first magnitude.
Perhaps most important was the simple historical fact that
Lüth (the fighter for reconciliation between Jews and Christians
in Germany) prevailed over the director of a notorious antiSemitic film under the Nazis. This fact had tremendous symbolic
value in a period still not far removed from the end of the Nazi
regime and, indeed, the Court’s opinion pointedly emphasized
Lüth’s activities toward reconciliation. Indeed, by reversing a
decision that favored Veit Harlan, “one of the propagandists of the
Holocaust,” the Court overturned a judgment that otherwise
would have stood as “a posthumous insult and disparagement of
the victims of persecution.”35
Moreover, the Lüth opinion is replete with other messages of
a new constitutional beginning. First, the opinion in Lüth clearly
recognized the authority of constitutional law over the ordinary
civil law. In the United States today, such a conclusion seems
almost self-evident 36 but it was far from self-evident in
Germany at the time. The German Civil Code (with its Roman
law origins) had a deep tradition, and Lüth’s opponents argued
that the constitution as a form of “public law” was simply
inapplicable to disputes of private law. In a nuanced argument of
profound importance for the future of German constitutional law,
the Court rejected this retrograde position.
—

—

—

In a second crucial argument for the future, the Court took
pains to establish the freedom of speech as a serious and
enforceable constitutional right a step that also marked a
dramatic turning away from the Wilhelmine, Weimar and (of
—

34. Public protests against Harlan’s new film were frequently met by
anti-Semitic responses from onlookers. Id. at 153, 170-72, 174; see also
WESEL, supra note 6, at 135.
35. Friedrich Kübler, Lüth: eine sanfte Revolution, 83 K RITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 313
(2000).
36. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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course) the Nazi past. Moreover, this step required a heroic rewriting of the Basic Law. The Basic Law indeed protected the
freedom of expression, but it also appeared to declare that a
“general law” of Parliament could ordinarily remove that
protection.37 In a highly inventive interpretation (actually, a
revision) of the text, the Court found that a “general law”, which
might seem to limit the freedom of expression, is itself limited by
that constitutional right. In the Court’s view, the result of this
reciprocal limitation was that even a “general law” could not limit
the freedom of expression if, under the circumstances, the values
of speech prevailed in a general balancing of relevant interests.
Notably, as an introduction to this adoption of constitutional
balancing, the Court quoted (in English) the words of Justice
Cardozo declaring that the freedom of expression is “the matrix,
the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom.”38 In perhaps another sign of adherence to western
constitutional values, the Court also quoted relevant language
from the French Declaration of Rights of 1789.
In undertaking the required balancing in Lüth, the Court also
sounded the theme of a new beginning endorsing Lüth’s desire
to exclude Harlan’s film as an appropriate sign to the world that
Germany had turned away from the Nazi past, and declaring that
Lüth’s work in seeking reconciliation between Christians and
Jews gave legitimacy to his words.39
In the 1950s the Restorationist view probably remained the
majority position in German politics and society. If so, the
Constitutional Court, with its mixture of Restorationist and
Reconstructionist opinions with the balance falling on the
Reconstructionist side can be seen as a generally progressive
force of that period. But ambivalence remained, for example, in
the famous Spiegel case of 1966, in which the Court upheld by
an equally divided vote a highly intrusive police raid on a
—

—

—

—

—

37. Art. 5 (1), (2) GG. Under Art. 19 (2) GG, protection could not be
removed if the “essential content” of the right would be impaired. But, as
Professor Currie notes, Art. 19 (2) seems to have had only a minor impact.
See D AVID P. C URRIE, T HE CONSTITUTION OF THE F EDERAL R EPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 178-81 (1994).
38. 7 BVerfGE at 208 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327
(1937)).
39. 7 BVerfGE at 216-18.
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journal’s editorial offices, which evoked memories of the Nazi
past.40
The upheavals of 1968, and the advent of the first Social
Democratic government a year later, seemed to mark a turn to
“more democracy” in West German political life. But, swinging to
the right, the Constitutional Court struck down several Social
Democratic reforms.41
Even the doctrinal foundations and historical meaning of
Lüth were called into question in 1971 when the Court (again by
an equally divided vote) upheld a judgment banning a novel by an
author who had fled the Nazis, on the grounds that it defamed a
noted collaborator with the Nazi regime.42 The author was Klaus
Mann, son of the great writer Thomas Mann. The novel was
Mephisto, a thinly-veiled criticism of Gustaf Gründgens, a famous
actor of the Weimar era who continued his eminent career under
the Nazis as a protégé of Luftwaffe commander Hermann
Göring.43
Like Harlan, Gustaf Gründgens was a major Restorationist
figure who, notwithstanding his intimate collaboration with the
Nazis, seamlessly assumed a leading role in the post-War German
theater. But in Mephisto, in contrast with Lüth, the interests of
the Restorationist figure prevailed, and the work of an opponent of
the Nazi regime, who had been forced into exile, was not
protected. The result was that an important contemporary
critique of artists and intellectuals who had collaborated with the
Nazi regime was banned in post-War Germany for several years.
Moreover, as far as constitutional doctrine was concerned, the
prevailing position in the Mephisto case seemed, in comparison
40. 20 BVerfGE 162 (1966). In German constitutional procedure, an
equally divided vote of the Constitutional Court results in upholding the
governmental action that was challenged as unconstitutional.
41. See 48 BVerfGE 127 (1978) (striking down liberalized procedure for
claiming conscientious objector status); 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975) (striking down
abortion reform law); 35 BVerfGE 79 (1973) (striking down aspects of
university reform).
42. 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971) (Mephisto). See Menzel, supra note 25, at 234.
43. The novel’s protagonist, the Nazi collaborator “Hendrik Höfgen,” was
recognizably a portrait of Gründgens. The novel was found defamatory
because Höfgen was portrayed as performing certain discreditable acts that
Gründgens apparently had not performed. As both Gründgens and Klaus
Mann died before the Constitutional Court litigation, the actual parties in the
case were Gründgens’ adopted son and the publishers of Mephisto.
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with Lüth, to depreciate the importance of freedom of expression
(here characterized as artistic freedom).44 The prevailing opinion
also depreciated the strength of constitutional law in comparison
with the ordinary private law, by deferring substantially to the
ordinary private law courts in the balancing of constitutional and
private law interests. This deference contrasted sharply with
Lüth, in which the Court fully reviewed the private law judgment
and reversed on the grounds that Lüth’s constitutional rights had
not been adequately protected.45
More recently, the change of generations has heralded a
liberalizing trend in expanding rights of speech and religion in the
Constitutional Court.46 Yet, even today, there seem to be some
remnants or, one might say, vestiges of Restorationist views for
example, in the Court’s assertions of the inviolability of “German
statehood” (cast in terms of protection of democracy) in the
Maastricht and recent Lisbon Treaty decisions.47 Indeed, these
ideas may well be related to the ethnic definition of German
citizenship, one of the most Restorationist aspects of the original
Basic Law.48
—

Comment on the Maastricht and Lisbon decisions brings us
essentially to the present. A retrospective view of this 60-year
sweep of history shows as we would expect that, in general the
Constitutional Court has largely turned away from Restorationist
views and something like Reconstructionist doctrine has
prevailed. Yet the occasional persistence of what seem like
distinct echoes of old Restorationist doctrine remains a possible
cause for concern. In the Constitutional Court, it seems, the book
—

—

44. See Art. 5 (3) GG.
45. In another contrast with Lüth, the Court in Mephisto seems to have
ignored the fact that Klaus Mann had been forced into exile by the Nazis and
then had been a vigorous opponent of the Nazi regime. In Lüth, in contrast,
the Court had given significant weight to Lüth’s rejection of the Nazi past −
his efforts toward reconciliation of Christians and Jews. See generally, 30
BVerfGE at 224-27 (dissenting opinion of Justice Rupp-v. Brünneck); Menzel,
supra note 25, at 234.
46. See, e.g., 93 BVerfGE 266 (1995) (constitutional protection for slogan
“Soldiers are murderers”); 93 BVerfGE 1 (1995) (Crucifix in public school
classrooms violates rights of dissenting parents); see also, e.g., 109 BVerfGE
279 (2004) (expansion of rights against electronic surveillance).
47. 89 BVerfGE 155 (1993) (Maastricht); 123 BVerfGE 267 (2009)
(Lisbon).
48. See Art. 116 GG.
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is not yet completely closed on these questionable doctrines of the
past.

